Part 13

A Case Study in Banking Safeguarding Misuse

Introduction

When a bank and a regulator rely on evidence the customer is not permitted to see, safeguarding loses transparency and becomes structurally unsafe. This update explains how undisclosed internal documents shaped the Financial Ombudsman’s investigation, why the complainant was advised to submit Subject Access Requests (SARs) to both Halifax and the Ombudsman, and how the resulting disclosures revealed contradictions, reframing, and procedural failures that had previously been hidden from view.

The complaint was referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) on 26 March 2026, following Halifax’s Final Response dated 11 March 2026. On 14 May 2026, the Investigator introduced himself and confirmed that he had received Halifax’s evidence bundle. On 10 June 2026, he issued his formal view, stating that he had “listened to the calls” and “reviewed the branch notes” supplied by Halifax — evidence the complainant had never been shown.

Halifax also stated that some documents had been provided to the Ombudsman “in confidence,” and the Investigator relied on these materials when forming his decision. Because the complainant was not permitted to see the evidence used to justify the outcome, and because Halifax refused to disclose the same material directly, the complainant was advised to submit Subject Access Requests (SARs) to both Halifax and the FOS.

The purpose of these SARs was to obtain the same evidence already used in the investigation, to understand how decisions were made, and to identify whether information had been withheld, misinterpreted, or relied upon without the complainant’s knowledge.

Section 1 — Why the SAR Was Submitted

The SAR was triggered by three factors:

1. Halifax provided the Ombudsman with confidential evidence the complainant had never seen.

This included internal notes, staff statements, fraud‑workflow outputs, and documents marked “strictly confidential.”

2. The FO Investigator relied on this undisclosed evidence when rejecting the complaint.

He stated he had “listened to calls” and “reviewed branch notes,” but did not disclose or summarise them.

3. Halifax refused to provide the same evidence directly to the complainant.

They stated that certain documents could not be shared, despite being about the complainant and used in the investigation.

Because the complainant could not meaningfully respond to evidence she had never seen, the SAR became essential.

Section 2 — What Halifax Disclosed

Halifax’s SAR response arrived on 26 July 2026. The material was extensive and not provided in any logical order, so the complainant organised the documents into eight structured files. Files 1–5 contained historical account information and routine banking records arranged chronologically for completeness. The core evidence relevant to the investigation was contained in three files:

File 6 — Internal notes and system records

File 7 — Halifax’s submission to the Financial Ombudsman

File 8 — Confidential documents provided to the Ombudsman

Together, these files revealed:

• Shifts in how the complainant’s explanations were recorded, creating inconsistencies that did not exist in real time.
• Reduced acknowledgement of documented communication needs, despite clear support‑needs flags.
• Missing safeguarding context, even though no risk indicators were present.
• Use of internal procedural flags that shaped the narrative without evidence‑led justification.
• Contradictions within Halifax’s own records, including callback failures and reframed notes.
• Retrospective reconstruction of events, replacing contemporaneous accuracy with later interpretation.
• Analysis of spending patterns, used to support safeguarding assumptions unrelated to fraud risk.
• A recorded decline of the withdrawal, contradicting Halifax’s claim that access was never refused.
• Categorisation under EBI, despite no fraud‑system triggers or safeguarding concerns.
• Flags indicating “customer refused evidence,” even though the complainant was not required to provide any.
• Internal labels and descriptors, including tone‑based comments not supported by system notes.
• Narrative construction within Halifax’s FO submission, presenting assumptions as factual evidence.

These disclosures contradicted Halifax’s complaint response and the Ombudsman’s decision.

Section 3 — File 5 Findings: Internal Notes and Reframing

File 5 showed that Halifax’s internal notes did not accurately record what occurred. 

Instead, they reframed:

3.1 Timeline updates as “conflicting reasons”

A normal change in circumstances was recorded as inconsistency.

3.2 Documented hearing‑loss support needs as “no trouble communicating”

This contradicted Halifax’s own support‑needs record.

3.3 Emotional distress as “some inconvenience”

Minimising the impact of public questioning and warnings.

3.4 A failed callback as “no error”

Despite internal notes confirming the failure.

3.5 Recording the presence of a second adult

Halifax’s internal notes confirm that staff recorded the presence of a second adult who accompanied the complainant. The notes also clarify that this individual was her son and was well known to a staff member.

Section 4 — File 6 Findings: Halifax’s Submission to the FO

File 6 revealed how Halifax constructed its narrative for the Ombudsman.

4.1 Conflicting reasons were emphasised

Halifax’s submission to the FO emphasised several different explanations for refusing the withdrawal. This conflicted with their own internal notes, which alternated between stating that the withdrawal was declined, not declined, and may be declined by the fraud team.

4.2 Safeguarding concerns were implied

Despite no fraud system flags or safeguarding notes, Halifax’s submission suggested that staff had concerns about the customer’s safety, even though no such concerns were recorded at the time.

4.3 Warnings were reframed as “managing expectations”

Halifax described their repeated warnings about fraud checks and possible account freezes as “managing expectations,” despite these warnings having a clear intimidating impact on the customer.

4.4 Emotional harm was minimised

Halifax acknowledged that the customer became distressed during the incident, but their submission downplayed the emotional impact and did not consider how the handling of the withdrawal contributed to that distress.

4.5 Refusal of privacy was reframed as “branch safety protocol”

Halifax explained that a private room could not be used because moving cash through internal areas posed a risk to staff. While staff safety is important, this reasoning conflicted with the bank’s repeated claims that they were concerned for the customer’s safety. Requiring the withdrawal to take place at a public counter increased the customer’s exposure, not reduced it, and did not align with the stated safeguarding concerns.

4.6 A goodwill payment was offered while denying any error

A contradiction carried into the FO submission.

This file showed how Halifax’s internal assumptions became the foundation of the FO’s decision.

Section 5 — File 7 Findings: Confidential Evidence Provided to the FO

File 7 contained documents Halifax marked “strictly confidential,” including:

• internal case reports
• staff statements
• fraud‑workflow outputs
• internal flags
• spending‑history analysis
• system notes
• the “customer refused evidence” flag
• “declined transaction” note
• EBI categorisation — an internal “Evidence‑Based Intervention” tag used when staff apply additional scrutiny, even though no fraud or safeguarding flags were present. It is not a fraud flag, not a safeguarding marker, and not a refusal. It is simply an internal “extra attention” tag.

5.1 Misuse of Spending History

Routine purchases and lawful withdrawals were presented as behavioural indicators, despite having no relevance to fraud risk.

5.2 Procedural Flags Used as Justification

“EBI required,” “customer refused evidence,” and “declined transaction” were used to support Halifax’s narrative.

5.3 Confidentiality Used to Prevent Visibility

Marking documents “strictly confidential” prevented the complainant from seeing how her behaviour was being interpreted.

These documents were relied upon by the FO but withheld from the complainant.

Section 6 — Safeguarding & Vulnerability

The SAR revealed that Halifax recorded no safeguarding concerns about the complainant or the second adult present during the branch visits. Despite this, the 

FO decision introduced a safeguarding concern that did not exist in Halifax’s evidence.

The Investigator stated:

“Another adult was present… so I can understand why the bank had concerns.”

This interpretation was:

• assumption‑based
• factually incorrect
• unsupported by Halifax’s records
• inconsistent with FCA FG21/1
• harmful to the vulnerable adult present
• a safeguarding failure within the investigation itself

The second adult had a legitimate reason to be present and was attending the branch for their own banking business. They were present at both visits — not one — and Halifax raised no concerns about their presence.

Section 7 — Procedural Fairness

The SAR disclosures and the Investigator’s written decision highlighted multiple procedural issues in how the complaint was handled.

7.1 Reliance on undisclosed evidence

The Investigator relied on internal Halifax material that had not been shared with the complainant, limiting transparency and preventing meaningful response.

7.2 Refusal to consider new evidence

Additional evidence raised during the investigation was not reviewed, contrary to DISP 3.6.1R, which requires all relevant material to be considered, even if it emerges later.

7.3 Misinterpretation of vulnerability

The reasoning applied did not align with FCA FG21/1, particularly in relation to recognising and responding to documented support needs.

7.4 Minimisation of emotional harm

Distress was reframed as “inconvenience,” which did not reflect the safeguarding context or the seriousness of the harm experienced.

7.5 Continued involvement after escalation

After the complainant formally requested Ombudsman review on 15 June 2026, the Investigator continued to act as the case handler. He reviewed escalation reasons, requested calls, issued instructions, set deadlines, managed evidence submissions, provided procedural updates, and later communicated the closure of the case. This is inconsistent with standard FOS procedure and raises concerns about independence, role boundaries, and whether the Ombudsman conducted a genuinely separate review.

7.6 Investigator issuing the Ombudsman’s decision

The Ombudsman’s final decision was delivered by the Investigator, who temporarily changed his job title from “Investigator” to “Decision Help” for this communication. He then reverted to “Investigator” when responding to the complainant’s rejection of the decision. This role-switching is inconsistent with FOS workflow and undermines confidence in the independence and integrity of the Ombudsman’s decision-making process.

Section 8 — Evidence Handling Across Both Stages

To understand how both Halifax and the Financial Ombudsman Service handled the complaint, the complainant submitted Subject Access Requests (SARs) to each organisation. Halifax’s SAR revealed multiple inconsistencies, reframed notes, and confidential material that had been provided to the FO without the complainant ever seeing it.

These findings made it necessary to request a full FO SAR to understand how this material was interpreted, used, and relied upon during the investigation — especially given the Investigator’s unusual involvement in finalising and closing the case, and the FO’s attempts to divert the complainant away from obtaining a SAR.

Section 9 — FO SAR Non‑Compliance and Formal Notice Issued

The complainant submitted a full Subject Access Request (SAR) to the Financial Ombudsman Service on 26 July 2026. Under UK GDPR, the FO was legally required to provide a response by 26 August 2026.

Despite this statutory obligation, no disclosure was provided, and the deadline passed without explanation or extension. This failure constitutes a breach of Article 12(3) GDPR, which requires organisations to respond to SARs within one calendar month.

In addition, the FO’s earlier correspondence attempted to limit the scope of the SAR by stating that it would not provide:

• notes recorded during the investigation
• emails exchanged between FO staff
• draft versions of documents
• internal communications relating to the case
• records showing how evidence was handled
• the reasoning applied during review
• documents supplied by Halifax
• material marked “confidential”
• any evidence used in decision making unless the complainant’s name appeared on the page

This interpretation is incorrect under GDPR.

Under Article 4(1) and Article 15, any information used to:

• assess the complainant
• interpret their behaviour
• evaluate their communication needs
• determine the outcome of the complaint
• form the Investigator’s view
• form the Ombudsman’s decision

…is legally classified as personal data, even if the complainant’s name does not appear on the page.

Because the FO both missed the statutory deadline and indicated an intention to unlawfully withhold personal data, the complainant issued a Formal Notice: Late SAR Response & Unlawful Withholding of Personal Data on 29 August 2026, requiring:

• full disclosure of all internal FO records
• a revised date for SAR completion
• assurance that exemptions will not be misapplied
• inclusion of all categories of personal data

The complainant also notified the FO that failure to comply would result in escalation to:

• the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)
• the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)
• an internal review of FO data‑handling practices

Despite these warnings, the FO did not provide the outstanding SAR. This failure set the stage for the events that unfolded in September 2026.

Section 10 — September 2026 FO Correspondence:

Contradictions, Withheld Data & Second GDPR Breach

The events that followed in September 2026 revealed further procedural failures within the Financial Ombudsman Service (FO), including contradictory statements, partial admissions, and continued non‑compliance with UK GDPR. These developments provide additional evidence of structural safeguarding concerns and reinforce the pattern already documented across Halifax and the FO.

10.1 — 01 September 2026: FO Issues an Incomplete SAR Response

On 01 September 2026, the FO stated that it had “processed” the complainant’s Subject Access Request (SAR). The disclosure consisted almost entirely of:

• Halifax’s evidence bundle
• emails between the complainant and FO staff
• call recordings already known to the complainant

Crucially, the FO did not disclose: :

• investigator notes
• Ombudsman commentary
• Phoenix workflow activity
• decision‑making records
• reasoning used to reach conclusions
• staff communications relating to the case
• annotations made during review
• draft versions of documents
• records of internal review steps
• any safeguarding or vulnerability assessments

The FO applied exemptions that do not apply to closed cases, including claiming that disclosure would “prejudice the discharge of statutory functions.” This interpretation is inconsistent with UK GDPR and with the FO’s own published guidance.

10.2 — 03 September 2026: Final Notice Issued for Incomplete SAR

On 03 September 2026, the complainant issued a Formal Notice – Incomplete SAR Response, listing all missing categories of internal personal data and providing evidence that the FO held these records. The notice highlighted:

• automated Phoenix allocation emails showing workflow activity
• decision‑making tasks created within Phoenix
• notes recorded during the investigation
• communications exchanged between the investigator and the Ombudsman

The complainant gave the FO 14 days to provide a complete SAR response, warning that failure to comply would result in escalation to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO).

10.3 — 07 September 2026: FO Contradiction & Partial Admission

On 07 September 2026, the FO responded with two contradictory statements:

“I’m satisfied that we have shared all personal data held on our systems” followed immediately by:

“The History & Actions of the complaint may include some of your personal data… please advise if you would like me to add these.”

• This contradiction is significant. It demonstrates that:
• internal personal data was withheld
• the organisation was aware that material had been withheld
• additional disclosure was only offered after challenge
• the earlier claim of “full disclosure” was incorrect

The FO’s admission that “History & Actions” contains personal data confirms that the original SAR response was incomplete and non‑compliant.

10.4 — 07 September 2026: Complainant Requests Missing Internal Data

Later the same day, the complainant formally requested:

• the full “History & Actions” record
• notes made during the case
• logs showing how the file was handled
• workflow activity recorded in Phoenix
• communications exchanged between FO staff
• records showing how decisions were reached
• the reasoning applied during the investigation
• annotations added during review

This request reset the FO’s obligation to provide the missing personal data.

10.5 — Continued FO Non‑Compliance After 07 September

As of the date of this update, the FO has still not provided:

• the “History & Actions” record
• notes made during the investigation
• the reasoning applied to reach conclusions
• staff communications relating to the case
• Phoenix workflow activity
• records showing how decisions were made
• draft versions of documents
• any safeguarding or vulnerability assessments
• annotations added during review
• logs of internal review steps
• This constitutes a second breach of UK GDPR.
• Article 12(3) — failure to respond within one calendar month
• Article 15 — failure to provide all personal data held

The FO’s silence after 07 September demonstrates ongoing non‑compliance and avoidance.

10.6 — Why These September Events Matter

The September correspondence reveals:

• contradictions in FO statements
• admission of withheld internal personal data
• failure to apply GDPR correctly
• avoidance after being challenged
• continued reliance on exemptions that do not apply
• structural safeguarding concerns within the FO
• lack of transparency in evidence handling
• procedural inconsistency
• ongoing harm caused by regulatory failure

These behaviours mirror the same patterns documented earlier:

• misdirection
• minimisation
• reframing
• reliance on unseen evidence
• boundary breaches
• procedural opacity

The September events confirm that safeguarding failures occurred not only at branch level, but also within the regulatory process itself.

10.7 — ICO Escalation Trigger

The FO’s continued failure to provide the missing internal personal data within the 14‑day deadline triggers escalation to:

• the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)
• the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)
• an internal FO data‑handling review

This escalation is now active.

The claimant’s need is straightforward: to understand how the FO came to its decision. If that decision was shaped by mistakes, omissions, or withheld evidence, the complainant has no real path to challenge it. That absence of remedy is part of the wider problem this case exposes.

With the FO still withholding key records, the investigation cannot yet be completed. Part 14 will follow once the missing data is disclosed — or once the matter is escalated formally to the ICO. 

These September events did not occur in isolation; they built upon the underlying issues raised in the original complaint.

As the FO has still not disclosed the missing records, the investigation remains open.

To understand why these September events matter, it is necessary to return to the substance of the original complaint.

What the Complaint Was Actually About

The complaint concerned Halifax’s conduct during two lawful cash withdrawal attempts. It focused on the bank’s refusal to allow access to the complainant’s own money, the demand for documentation that had no legal basis, the public questioning about private financial matters, the misuse of fraud mechanisms, and the distress caused by being interrogated in an open banking hall.

The complaint also raised concerns about Halifax’s contradictory explanations, failure to recognise documented support needs, and the emotional harm caused by the refusal of privacy. It did not relate to the complainant’s son, her explanations, or the purpose of the withdrawal. These elements were introduced later by the Investigator and did not reflect the substance of the original complaint.

Explaining the Pattern

The events across Halifax, the Investigator, and the Financial Ombudsman Service reveal a consistent pattern of misdirection. At each stage, the focus shifted away from Halifax’s conduct and toward the complainant, her statements, and her son’s presence. Safeguarding concerns were reframed as suspicion, emotional harm was minimised as “inconvenience,” and procedural obligations were narrowed or avoided.

The Investigator restricted the scope of the complaint, relied on confidential evidence the complainant could not see, and later attempted to redirect her into a “service complaint” route that would not examine the substantive issues.

The Financial Ombudsman’s SAR response continued this pattern, steering the complainant away from full disclosure and signalling an intention to limit searches and withhold internal records. Taken together, these behaviours raise concerns about transparency, independence, and whether the regulatory process was applied proportionately and fairly.

Conclusion

The findings in Part 3 reflect what can be evidenced from Halifax’s SAR, the Investigator’s correspondence, and the Ombudsman’s written decision. Halifax’s disclosures have already revealed inconsistencies, reframed notes, and confidential material that shaped the FO’s investigation. However, full cross‑matching of evidence across both stages cannot be completed until the Financial Ombudsman Service provides its outstanding SAR.

The FO SAR will confirm how Halifax’s internal material was interpreted, relied upon, or misapplied; how vulnerability and safeguarding concerns were assessed; and whether the Ombudsman’s decision was based on independent review or on the Investigator’s reasoning.

Part 13 closes at a point where key FO records remain withheld. 

CURB will publish the next stage of this case once those records are disclosed and cross‑referenced with Halifax’s SAR — which has already revealed serious data‑handling breaches — or when regulatory escalation advances.

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